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It is impossible for me to convey an appreciation of Bochner and his accom- 
plishment in history of mathematics and science otherwise than in personal terms 
or to imagine,how his writings would read in the eyes of people who did not know 
him. His judgments were alive with idiosyncrasy. When something that was being 
presented in seminar pleased him, he would fairly tingle in his place at the table, 
straining forward, eyes alight, urging the point onward with “Beautiful, very 
beautiful,” half under his breath and perhaps not consciously uttered. Even at 
those moments we could never feel quite comfortable with our success, for it 
remained unclear whether we were the ones exciting the response or whether it 
was Aristotle or Fermat or Leibniz refracted through the glass of our optically 
uneven sensibilities, now mercifully translucent and too soon again opaque. The 
opaque interludes were terrible. Bochner’s expression would collapse through 
phases marking disappointment, incomprehension, boredom, and despair until at 
the worst moments he rescued his sanity, his slightly puckish sanity, by falling 
asleep. On such occasions he might murmur something at the beginning of the 
coffee break and go off into the stacks, ostensibly in search of a book, never to 
return that day. Whether he taught us anything explicitly, I should be hard pressed 
to say, but certainly his presence, and the dread of provoking his absence, put us 
on our mettle. That was not his intention, and I think he was unaware of his effect. 
His intention was to participate in discourse about the history of science, his 
violon d’Ingres, which he played to the strains of an inner melody. It happened 
that a doctoral program in history and philosophy of science got under way at 
Princeton in 1960. Apparently we did not disgrace ourselves in the first year or 
two, for Albert Tucker, then Chairman of the Mathematics Department, took me 
(a fairly junior faculty member) aside one day and intimated that Bochner might 
be receptive to an invitation to associate himself with our work, but that he was 
too shy to say so. Bochner, he went on, was not only a leading but a learned 
mathematician. The former fact had already been born in on me by the subliminal 
* This essay was written at the request of mathematical colleagues in 1983, shortly after the death of 
Salomon Bochner (August 20, 1899-May 2, 1982). It was to have been published with several other 
memorials concerning the main aspects of his life and career. That project did not go forward. I am 
grateful to Historiu Muthematica for allowing me thus to make known the admiration and enjoyment 
experienced by my students and myself throughout Bochner’s participation in our studies during the 
last 5 years that he served on the Princeton faculty. He retired in 1968 and moved to Rice University, 
where he was Chairman of the Mathematics Department from 1969 until 1976. 
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vibrations that transmit the general consent of a university in matters of reputa- 
tion. The latter information, such is the frailty of scholarly natures, only increased 
my apprehensiveness. Would that all unworthy fears turned out to be as ground- 
less, for Bochner’s joining the staff of our program in its early years was the 
making of it. 
Bochner had long since been giving himself the pleasure of studying (he might 
rather have said “savoring,” a favorite word) the classics in the history of mathe- 
matics and mechanics beginning in antiquity. Since he had been educated in the 
classical Gymnasium, he knew Greek and Latin no less than modern languages, 
and he always sought out the earliest edition to be found of any text. His taste in 
the secondary literature was more haphazard, not to say quixotic. There were 
penetrating remarks on occasion, but Bochner’s judgment of the scholarship of 
others was not, in my view, always illuminating. On the other hand, he proved to 
be an excellent judge of the qualitites of our students. 
A word first about his vision of the subject- I do not want to call it anything so 
mundane as a point of view. Emphatically, his was not the attitude that historians 
of science recognize and tend to deplore as characteristic of scientists and mathe- 
maticians: a taste for anecdote, often spiced by a touch of malice; a nose for 
scandal, particularly in the matter of priorities; an interest in substance only 
insofar as pieces of past science appear to be approximations, more or less awk- 
ward, to what is known now. 
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Not so Bochner. He was that rare, perhaps that unique mathematician whose 
historical sensibility was formed, not at bottom by the mathematics he practiced, 
but by the philological tradition out of which he explored its reaches in civiliza- 
tion. Central European rather than strictly Polish, Bochner was of the last genera- 
tion of scholars who still incarnated’the reality that German universities made of 
the ideal of culture down to the catastrophes of the 20th century. He sometimes 
exhibited the classicist’s or the humanist’s instinct, the reverse of the scientist’s, 
that the ancients, an Aristotle, an Archimedes, a Euclid, were and had to be of 
greater stature than the moderns. These are only half-heard overtones, however, 
not symptoms of adulation. More important was the complement. Nowhere in his 
writings is there the faintest trace of condescension toward scientists or science in 
the past. When criticism is in order, it is the kind that might be visited on a 
contemporary. 
And yet, we cannot make of Bochner an historian’s scientist-historian, treating 
science in relation to its own time and context rather than as a function of its 
future. The difference is not only that he betrayed no interest in effects of social 
and political conditioning, a preoccupation that in the 1970s might have gone to an 
extreme from which it shows signs of receding. There was more to Bochner’s 
distinctiveness than that. Historians, whatever their persuasion about fundamen- 
tal factors in the historical process, are interested primarily in development: not 
just in what the event or, in the case of science, the discovery, theorem, or treatise 
was in itself, though of course they need to know that, but in how one event 
followed from and led to others in time and circumstance. In Bochner’s perspec- 
tive all of mathematics wears the appearance not altogether of intellectual contem- 
poraneity, as I was about to say, but of a deeper contemporaneity residing in 
intuition. His writings, therefore, convey nothing of the process of development 
of exact science even though they do identify stages through which it has passed. 
These stages or phases are seen as conditions, however, as a series of states of 
knowledge with no nexus running between them. 
A certain tension, not to say ambivalence, in his outlook is evident in a lengthy 
essay “How History of Science Differs from Other History” [1966, Chap. 21. 
Bochner was widely read in the great historians-Herodotus, Thucydides, Taci- 
tus, Gibbon, Ranke, Mommsen. There are hints that he really thought general 
history a richer and more rewarding body of subject matter than history of sci- 
ence. He once said so to me. That is not just because general history concerns the 
whole life of mankind, but because the strict criteria of science impose limits on 
what can be said about its history. Archimedes was a judge of his own accomplish- 
ments in a way that Alexander the Great was not. Science internalizes its own 
history and in some degree represses it. The historian of science must be circum- 
spect and respect the taboos that are inseparable from its creation and also the 
success of the outcome that has prevailed. General history is free of such con- 
straints and is inexhaustible. At the same time, Bochner’s sense of general history 
was by no means that of a professional historian. The distinctions on this side are 
of a different order, however. His was the historiography of Hegel, of the Ger- 
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manic personification of abstractions, of-not to put too fine a point upon it- 
Spengler, and no practitioner of history as a succession of mind-sets of the Zeit- 
geist could have been more out of favor than Spengler among historians for the 
last half-century, for both professional and political reasons. In Bochner’s essays, 
too, the great historical periods become actors in the drama: the Middle Ages, the 
Renaissance, the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. Each is endowed with aspects of 
collective intellect and will; thus: “The 17th century was an age of revelation: the 
18th century was an age of patristic organization; and the 19th century was an age 
of canonical legislation. If we dared to continue we might suggest that the 20th 
century is an age of reformation. . . .” Periods and even sciences become sub- 
jects of verbs in the active voice, thus: “The Renaissance did little for physics but 
much for mathematics,” and “Rational Mechanics also gradually introduced the 
concept of a purely mathematical space which is multi-dimensional . . .” [ 1966, 
180, 220, 2461. 
Although Bochner conveyed no notion of strictly historical development, in the 
case of mathematics and mechanics he nevertheless did see growth, a kind of 
intrinsic maturing of collective powers. These actualizations of a potentiality in 
the life of the discipline are virtually Aristotelian. They are not explained. They 
are recognized. They come about “somehow,” another favorite word, which 
Bochner somehow managed to employ with particular precision, and not as a 
vague gesture pointing away from ignorance. The organic quality of their emer- 
gence is further and pervasive witness to the chrysalis of Germanic historical 
sensibility. 
A deeper ambivalence underlies Bochner’s uncertainty over the value to be 
placed upon history of science in relation to general history. What is to be thought 
of mathematics itself, its very possibility, its claim upon culture, its penetration of 
other and perhaps one day all formal knowledge? In many passages he refers to 
mathematics as an esoteric activity, almost as a kind of pastime that by some 
destiny akin to that of myth imposes its rules upon ever wider sectors of reality. 
The figure of a game helps resolve a feature of his treatment that might otherwise 
appear inconsistent with the notion of intellectual contemporaneity and compara- 
bility of exact knowledge. For Bochner does feel free to take the Greeks to task 
for the ultimate sterility of their absorption in geometry, and specifically for their 
having missed developing a system of spatial and temporal coordinates. They 
were not inferior thinkers in his eyes. No, they were athletes who refused to 
modify their strategy and gain what was within their powers. Their failure ap- 
peared to Bochner almost “inexcusable” [1966, 521. A game is to be won. 
Apart from that, it is by no means obvious that other elements in the surround- 
ing community have reason to welcome extrapolation of the rules of any such 
game. Their own pleasure may be spoiled, their autonomy infringed. In fact, 
however, expansion of mathematics has transpired more by invitation from recipi- 
ents than by imposition from practitioners. At all events, there is nothing to be 
done about it. Bochner emphatically did not believe in the possibility, let alone the 
desirability, of channeling or guiding mathematical investigations. When he spoke 
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of younger generations and the directions they were taking, not all of which were 
to his taste, he would say, “You cannot prevent them,” without even a hint that 
he wished you could. 
The first of Bochner’s historical papers, “The Role of Mathematics in the Rise 
of Mechanics,” appeared in 1962. Substituting the word “science” for “mechan- 
ics,” he also made that the title of his first book, a collection of this and other 
essays published in the next 4 years. Another volume, Eclosion and Synthesis, 
Perspectives on the History of Knowledge [1969], was written in part out of his 
participation in the seminars of our Program in History and Philosophy of Sci- 
ence. In his last years at Rice University, Bochner composed further articles and 
monographs, several of them in the nature of reminiscence. In most instances, the 
titles of his papers are less indicative of the contents than is customary in histori- 
cal writing. Instead, each of the ostensible topics serves as the occasion to embark 
on discussion of certain favorite themes to which he recurs from these various 
points of departure. It will be more pertinent, therefore, to identify the themes 
themselves than to attempt a summary of discrete contributions. 
The underlying preoccupation, and perhaps the most signal motivation of the 
entire oeuvre, is indicated by the above title as modified to cover the contents of 
the earlier of the two books. How does it happen that mathematics applies to 
nature and even to society in such wise that it has become the most powerful 
strain in science? Ultimately, Bochner regards that, the dominant fact of Western 
intellectuality, as a mystery which he proposes to bring into relief in various ways 
but not to dispel. The Greeks, for their part, never developed a mathematical 
physics. Lacking, in Bochner’s view, were an idea of quantity expressible in real 
numbers, the practice of analysis, and the capacity for abstraction. Only in 17th- 
century mechanics did the concept of a moment become possible, the real-number 
product of unlike magnitudes. 
At this overt level, these findings of Bochner, and others like them, contain few 
surprises. The merit and originality of his discussion lie instead in many shrewd 
remarks in passing on such matters as functionality in Newton’s thinking and in 
general, 18th-century principles of mechanics, the absence of any need for energy 
considerations before the 19th century, the emergence of distinctions between 
scalar and vector quantities, the “complexification” of physics through the intro- 
duction of complex numbers, and so on. There are many variations on two recur- 
rent themes, first that there is a reciprocity between mathematics and physics, but 
second that it does not consist in deliberate steps, however successful, to mathe- 
maticize physics for specific purposes. Much of the mathematics that has proved 
most important to physics has originated without any thought of application in the 
course of purely mathematical investigations. Bochner was particularly intrigued 
by the frequent recourse in physics to pieces of “pre-fabricated mathematics,” 
resources like the tensor calculus of Ricci and Levi-Civita lying there ready to 
Einstein’s hand. 
In my view, the best sustained of Bochner’s substantive discussions is the essay 
“Aristotle’s Physics and Today’s Physics” [1964] together with the remarks on 
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physical and mathematical space that figure in that paper and are then elaborated 
in several others. Although his views on the historical process are redolent of 
19th-century philosophy, his views on science tend to come fundamentally down 
to earth. He resonates to Aristotle, not to Plato; to quantum mechanics, not to the 
mystique of relativity (his essay on Einstein [1979a] borders on the iconoclastic); 
to Kepler and Newton and Euler, not to Descartes and Leibniz and Kant. Here 
and there he will indulge philosophers who say things about scientific matters. 
Their “philosophemes” were another kind of pastime, however, that unlike math- 
ematics came to nothing beyond embroidery. Essentially, he considers that Aris- 
totle’s Physics is to be read as physics, and not as philosophy. The notion of time 
as a determinant of motion or change; the correspondence of its oneness to that of 
the universe; the study of cosmology as an extension of physics; the relation of 
chance to necessity; topos or place involving a notion of spatiality as the setting 
for a physical system; the explanation of motion by antiperistasis, or action of a 
medium, as akin to thermodynamical processes; certain of the yes-or-no signals 
that constitute computerized information- in these and other matters, Bochner 
finds comparisons between Aristotelian and modern modes of thinking that illumi- 
nate the one by the other, without his wanting to say that it is a question of 
anticipations or reversions. The thought patterns are comparable, that is all. 
Eclosion and Synthesis is a rather high-flown title for the second of Bochner’s 
historical volumes [ 19691. Perhaps the book may best be described as a tentative 
sketch for a comparative morphology of two great stages in the evolution of 
systematic knowledge. Bochner designates by “eclosion” the characteristics of 
the half-century from 1776 to 1825 and by “synthesis” those of the 20th century, 
mostly since the 1920s. Clearly, these terms would bear an enormous weight of 
generalization if they were to be taken literally and exhaustively. I do not think 
Bochner meant them that way. I think he meant them impressionistically as labels 
permitting him to gather into two loose bundles reflections upon his reading and 
experience. The opinions are a good deal more then desultory and a good deal less 
than systematic. More often than not they amount to insights. For example, the 
period he calls eclosion had no identity in the historiography of science at the time 
of his writing. What he ascribes to it is not so much cognitive discovery or 
conceptual innovation as it is the concretization of the modern learned disciplines 
in the form of professional entities-physics, chemistry, economics, and others, 
with emphasis on the very creation of mathematical and theoretical physics. Now, 
this observation, which Bochner does little more than assert, was right on target. 
The movement is now called the second scientific revolution, although I doubt 
that any of the many people working with its problems owe their start to his small, 
aphoristic book. 
The notion of synthesis in the 20th century is less fully circumscribed by dates 
and less tellingly illustrated by cross-disciplinary comparisons. By it, he means 
the momentum acquired by modern bodies of knowledge, their tendencies to 
internalize differences and disputes rather than to allow themselves to be trans- 
formed, the accelerating displacement of intellectuality by factuality, and the 
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widening and tightening of the grasp of mathematics. I think the most interesting 
passages, however, are those conveying Bochner’s skepticism, expressed in rela- 
tion to modern cosmology, about the commitment of Newton and classical phys- 
ics to the infinity of the universe, and those concerning Cezanne’s liberation of 
artistic perspective from the straitjacket of three-dimensional Euclidean space. 
In general, it should perhaps be said in conclusion, Bochner’s historical writings 
are more rewarding for their asides, their irreverences, their glancing observa- 
tions, than for their arguments, which are too fragmentary, introspective, and 
elliptical to be often persuasive. I do not mean that as anything but a high compli- 
ment. Professional life is stuffed with colleagues ever at our elbows trying to 
convince us. How much more agreeable on occasion, and how rare, to be in- 
trigued, to be amused, to be startled, to see something differently, however fleet- 
ingly. I close with a few examples. Of Euclid and his immunity to human and 
historical influences: “In short, it is almost impossible to refute an assertion that 
the Elements is the work of an unsufferable pedant and martinet” [ 1966, 351. Of 
rational mechanics versus the rest of physics: “Thus Newton composed not only 
his formidable Principia but also an insinuating Opticks, at first not in Latin but in 
English, so that even poets might read it, as some did” [1966,221]. And, finally, to 
the complaint that people missed the chance Leibniz had provided to found math- 
ematical logic in the 18th century: 
To this I wish to say, from hindsight, that, as developments went, everything turned out as 
well as one could wish for. The 18th century was extremely wise to give priority to construct- 
ing a thick basic layer of mathematics and erecting an edifice of rational mechanics; the 19th 
century was then the readier to initiate a mathematization of physics and of logic and the 
theoretization of other science. If  this kind of rationalization of mine is too crass a case of 
“being wise after the event,” then I wish to observe that, for my part, I have never felt 
dismay over savoring history, any history, backward through time, in addition to viewing it 
forward through time. [1966, 1011 
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